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The need for fiscal consolidation and sustainability is one of the key macroeconomic issues 
confronting Indian economy. This paper attempts to understand India’s current fiscal 
situation, its likely future development, and its impact on the economy in the context of a 
weak global recovery from the current crisis. The impact of the global crisis has been 
transmitted to the Indian economy through three distinct channels,  namely: the financial 
sector, exports, and exchange rates. The other significant channel of impact is the slump in 
business and consumer confidence leading to decrease in investment and consumption 
demand. The Indian government, to boost the demand, has announced several stimulus 
packages. However, there is not much room for further fiscal policy action as the 
consolidated fiscal deficit of the central and state governments in 2009–2010 is already 
about 11% of the gross domestic product (GDP). Any further increase in the fiscal deficit to 
GDP ratio could invite a sharp downgrading of India’s credit rating and a loss of business 
confidence. The paper reviews the existing theories on the relationship between fiscal deficit 
and growth. It also analyzes the past trends and policy measures to understand the possible 
implications for economic recovery and long run growth in the Indian context. It also provides 
a long-term forecast of the fiscal deficit and public debt burden based on the past trends. 
Finally, the paper suggests a set of policy measures to get the Indian economy back on the 
path of sustained rapid and inclusive growth. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Given India’s long history of running huge fiscal deficits, the sharp increase in its fiscal deficit 
over the last two years is a major concern for both academicians and policy- makers in India 
(Govinda Rao 2009; Rangarajan 2009). According to budget estimates for the fiscal year 
2009–2010, the ratio of fiscal deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) (for the central and 
state governments but excluding off-budget bonds) in India is expected to be 10.2%. This 
follows a sharp rise in the fiscal deficit ratio from 4.2% in 2007–2008 to 8.9% in 2008–2009. 
This increase reverses all the fiscal gains made since 2003–2004. Likewise, the debt to GDP 
ratio would be 76.6% for the year 2009–2010, which is up from 74.7% in 2008–2009.  
A higher fiscal deficit can be financed through domestic borrowing, external borrowing, or by 
printing money. Excessive domestic borrowing can put upward pressure on interest rates, 
while  external borrowing may result in an external debt crisis. Printing money would 
invariably lead to high inflation. Food inflation in India is running at more than 18%, lending 
credence to  an already  strong argument for adopting an exit strategy  from the existing 
stimulus programs. In the absence of such an  exit strategy, there will be tremendous 
pressure for tightening monetary policy and raising interest rates, leading to an  adverse 
impact on private investment, which remains sluggish.  
The relationship between fiscal deficit and output growth is a much debated issue, both in 
general and in the Indian context. Indeed, the need for fiscal consolidation and the 
achievement of fiscal sustainability continue to be the key macroeconomic issues 
confronting Indian policy makers.  
This paper attempts to understand India’s current fiscal situation before and after the current 
global financial crisis, its likely future evolution, and its impact on the economy in the context 
of a weak global recovery from the current crisis. This paper is divided into five sections. The 
following section provides an overview of some insights from economic literature into the 
relationship between fiscal deficit, public debt, and growth. Section 3 presents trends and 
patterns of the Indian fiscal situation over the past three decades and discusses the major 
fiscal reforms that have been undertaken in recent years. In this section there is also 
detailed examination of the structural and cyclical behavior of fiscal variables. Section 4 
discusses the impact of the current global crisis on fiscal balances in India. Finally, Section 5 
includes the contours of a feasible exit strategy for restoring fiscal balance. Section 3 
presents trends and patterns of the Indian fiscal situation over the past decades (1980–81 to 
2009–10), and discusses the major fiscal reforms that have been undertaken in recent years 
and examines the structural/cyclical behavior of fiscal variables in detail. Section 4 discusses 
the impact of the current global crisis on fiscal balances in India. Finally, Section 5 includes 
the contours of a feasible exit strategy for restoring fiscal balance. 
2.  THE NEXUS OF FISCAL DEFICIT AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH—THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
The impact of fiscal deficit on economic growth is a highly debated issue in economics. 
Apparently, there is no consensus among economists on this issue. One argument follows 
the concepts put forth by the economist John Maynard Keynes, and advocates that high 
fiscal deficits are not unusual for developing economies as governments use fiscal deficits to 
keep aggregate domestic demand at high levels in order  to generate growth and 
employment. High fiscal deficits accelerate capital accumulation and growth (Krishnamurty 
1984 and; 20012; Chandrasekhar 2000; Shetty 2001; Chelliah and Kavita Rao 2001; Murty 
and Soumya 2007). Those supporting the Keynesian approach argue that an increase in 
fiscal deficit due to public sector investment, especially in infrastructure, stimulates growth in 
the private sector.  Increasing public investment in an appropriate policy framework, ADBI Working Paper No. 249    Kumar and Soumya 
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therefore, gives the private sector adequate incentives to invest on a massive scale, 
resulting in overall economic growth. This is generally referred to as the positive “crowding 
in” impact of fiscal deficit. 
Classical  and  neo-classical theory, on the other hand, postulate that high fiscal deficits 
created through higher public investment may displace private investment, or more generally 
expenditure. According to this argument, public investment-driven fiscal deficits “crowd out” 
private investment through an increase in the interest rate, especially if government 
borrowing is used utilized to finance revenue deficit. It may also work through movements in 
the price level depending on how such investment is financed and the extent of capacity 
utilization in the economy. In general, public expenditure increases aggregate consumption 
in the economy, which leads to a reduction in aggregate savings. A reduction in aggregate 
savings results in higher interest rates, which in turn discourages private investment and 
overall economic activity in a closed economy.  
In an open economy, higher public investment leads to higher capital inflows and a real 
appreciation of the currency, which results in lower net exports and, again, a reduction in 
economic activity. In either case, higher public expenditure appears to result in a reduction in 
overall economic activity. An implicit assumption in the above argument is that the economy 
is already at near full capacity level.  
The efficacy of fiscal expansion has been questioned given the large fiscal deficits and the 
accumulation of a high debt to GDP ratio (Sundararajan and Thakur 1980; Easterly 2004). It 
has been argued that, apart from the problem of crowding out private investment, public 
spending is less efficient than the crowded out private investment, even if such spending is 
on investment. Therefore, controlling fiscal deficits spurs growth in the long run (Acharya 
2001; Rangarajan 2009).  
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has done significant research on the role of fiscal policy in 
reviving the Indian economy (RBI 2001). Research shows that an attempt to raise public 
consumption to revive aggregate demand  will  crowd out both private consumption and 
private investment with no long-run positive impact on output growth. Further, public 
investment in manufacturing appears to adversely affect private investment. However, 
government expenditure on infrastructure crowds in private investment. In addition, the level 
of fiscal deficit is also important because the positive impact of public sector infrastructure 
investment on private investment is predicated on the deficit remaining at the same or lower 
level. Despite differing opinions regarding the impacts of crowding out, RBI analysts mostly 
agree that excessive government consumption expenditure (especially on salaries, debt 
waivers, and subsidies) has a negative impact on growth. This is an issue of the political 
economy of government spending and the quality of fiscal adjustment, to which we return in 
later sections. 
Another view that differs from both the classical, neo-classical, and Keynesian approaches is 
the neo-Ricardian approach. The neo-Ricardian argument is that the impact of an increase 
in public investment on the economy is neutral. Rational economic agents in the economy try 
to adjust their expenditure in relation to movements in public expenditure. Hence, there is no 
effect on the economy and overall savings remain unchanged. The empirical support in favor 
of the Ricardian view seems to be weak (Ball and Mankiw 1995; Elmendorf and Mankiw 
1998). However, given that empirical studies support both the neo-classical and Keynesian 
views for India, no firm policy conclusion can be advanced .advanced. 
Fiscal imbalances have remained a cause for concern in India in recent years. Despite 
impressive increases in the revenue productivity from direct taxes, there is a real fear that 
fiscal imbalances will worsen, causing interest rates to harden and crowd out private 
investment. A higher fiscal deficit essentially means the government must take more loans 
from banks, preventing the extension of loans to other borrowers and driving up interest 
rates at the cost of industry and individual borrowers. With a deficit of over 10% and the 
household sector’s financial savings at just about 11% of GDP, borrowing of this magnitude ADBI Working Paper No. 249    Kumar and Soumya 
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leaves very little savings available for the corporate sector. This exerts significant pressure 
on interest rates. The excess demand created by large deficits could spill over to imports 
and create balance of payments problems as well.  
Other concerns have been voiced about controlling public spending and fiscal deficit. On the 
one hand, the government has to raise public spending to boost the economy; on the other, 
the fiscal deficit has to be controlled to avoid its ill effects. The expansionary fiscal policy of 
the last two years, it has been argued, cannot continue and an exit strategy will have to be 
put in place in the forthcoming budget to ensure fiscal sustainability and greater flexibility in 
monetary policy operation, enhance the productivity of public spending, and avoid pressure 
on interest rates (Govinda Rao 2009; Rangarajan 2009; Kumar 2009).  
Another argument is that focusing only on budget deficits can be misleading, because the 
problem of off-budget and contingent liabilities is also serious. Shifting liabilities off budget 
without reducing systemic risk does not improve matters. To achieve fiscal stability, attention 
needs to be given to optimal paths of public consumption, investment, taxes, and borrowing 
rather than only focusing on primary balances (Nirvikar sSingh and Srinivasan 2004).  
3.  TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN FISCAL VARIABLES IN 
INDIA 
A look at the trends and patterns over the last three decades (1980–2010), which span both 
the pre-  and post-reform period,  helps us understand the relationship between fiscal 
expansion and growth in the Indian economy. The first surge in India’s economic growth rate 
came in the early 1980s, when it increased to above 5% from the average “Hindu” growth 
rate
1 of 3.5% in earlier decades. Unfortunately, this spurt was achieved by unsustainable 
fiscal expansion financed by domestic credit and external borrowing. Growth accelerated to 
5.8% during the 1980s, but in the second half of the decade, fiscal and current account 
deficits widened significantly, causing serious macroeconomic imbalances and culminating 
in the balance of payment (BOP) crisis of 1991. These triggered the series of economic 
reforms  that  have been  introduced,  starting in 1991, to bring about macroeconomic 
stabilization and implement structural measures
2
In the following section, we analyze fiscal trends in greater detail. The analysis is based on 
an annual time series corresponding to the fiscal year (1 April to 31 March). The data is 
drawn mostly from the RBI’s Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy and Annual Reports 
and National Accounts Statistics published by the Central Statistical Organization (CSO).  
 to push up growth.  
3.1  Deficit Indicators 
The 1980s saw a sharp rise in the combined fiscal deficit of the central and state 
governments  to  8%  on average (see Table 3.1). Along with high external borrowings, a 
sustained increase in the combined revenue expenditure to stimulate demand, particularly in 
the services sector, caused the fiscal deficit to rise during the 1980s. As a result, the 
combined public debt became 56% of GDP on average, with interest payments at 14.6% of 
revenue expenditure (3% of GDP on average) accounting for a large portion of government 
                                                 
1 The “Hindu” rate of growth is a controversial expression coined by Raj Krishna used to hide the disastrous 
socialist policies followed by successive  Indian National Congress  governments. India's low annual growth 
rate of economy before 1991 was stagnant around 3.5%, and had been so since the 1950s. 
 
2  Structural measures initially emphasized accelerating the process of industrial and import de-licensing 
simultaneously, with a switch to a flexible exchange rate regime, and then shifted to further trade liberalization, 
financial sector reforms, and tax reforms.  
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revenue expenditure and creating a debt trap in the 1980s. During the first half of the 1980s, 
these revenue expenditures averaged 18.5% of GDP. In the second half, they rose to an 
average of 22.4%  with the bulk of the expansion coming  under the heads of defense, 
interest payments, higher salaries (Fourth Pay Commission) and subsidies.  
Studies by Srinivasan and Tendulkar (2003), Joshi and Little (1994), and others attribute the 
spurt in economic growth during the decade to demand-side factors. The flip side, however, 
was the spilling over of this into external balances. By 1990, the current account and fiscal 
deficits had risen to 3.5% and 9.4% of GDP respectively, leading to the BOP crisis of 1991 
(Ahluwalia 2000, Arvind  Panagariya 2004a and,  2004b;  Balakrishnan  and Suresh 2004; 
Nirvikar Singh and Srinivasan 2004). Containing this deficit was one of the key structural 
adjustments undertaken by the Indian government at the time. Economic reforms helped 
reduce the fiscal deficit, and the combined fiscal deficit fell to 6.3% of GDP in 1996–1997.  
Table 3.1: Finances of the Central and State Governments: Selected Indicators 
(As % of GDP) 
  Central  States  Combined 
Year  GFD  GPD  RD  GFD  GPD  RD  GFD  GPD  RD 
1980–1989  6.7  4.1  1.7  2.8  1.7  -0.1  7.9  4.9  1.6 
1990–1999  5.9  1.6  3.0  3.1  1.2  1.2  7.7  2.7  4.2 
2000–2001  5.7  0.9  4.1  4.2  1.8  2.6  9.5  3.6  6.6 
2001–2002  6.2  1.5  4.4  4.1  1.4  2.6  9.9  3.7  7.0 
2002–2003  5.9  1.1  4.4  4.1  1.2  2.3  9.6  3.1  6.6 
2003–2004  4.5  -0.03  3.6  4.4  1.5  2.3  8.5  2.1  5.8 
2004–2005  4.0  -0.04  2.5  3.4  0.7  1.2  7.5  1.3  3.6 
2005–2006  4.1  0.4  2.6  2.5  0.2  0.2  6.7  1.0  2.8 
2006–2007  3.5  -0.2  1.9  1.9  -0.4  -0.6  5.6  -0.01  1.3 
2007–2008  2.7  -0.9  1.1  1.4  -0.6  -0.9  4.2  -1.3  0.2 
2008–2009 
RE  6.1  2.5  4.5  2.7  0.7  -0.1  8.9  3.5  4.4 
2009–2010 
BE  6.8  3.0  4.8  3.4  1.4  0.6  10.2  4.5  5.5 
GFD: Gross Fiscal Deficit 
GPD: Gross Primary Deficit 
RD: Revenue Deficit 
RE: Revised Estimates 
BE: Budget Estimates 
 Source: RBI, various issues. 
 
A sharp increase in government salaries and pensions in the next year halted the process of 
fiscal improvement until 2003–2004 when the government introduced the Fiscal 
Responsibility and Budget Management Act
3
                                                 
3 The FRBM Act was enacted by Parliament in 2003; later, Mr. Chidambaram, the finance minister in the UPA 
(United Progressive Alliance) government, notified the act on 2 July 2004. 
 (FRBM) to control the fiscal deficit. The Act 
required the Government of India to bring down its revenue deficit by 0.5% of GDP each 
year until it touched zero, and to reduce its fiscal deficit by 0.3% each year to a level of 3.0% 
of GDP. The targets were to be achieved by 2008–2009. Further, it set an annual limit of 
9.0% on the union government’s total liabilities and capped union government guarantees ADBI Working Paper No. 249    Kumar and Soumya 
5 
for public sector units and state government loans at 0.5% of GDP. The targets laid out by 
the government’s FRBM Act and state-level fiscal responsibility legislations were achieved in 
2007–2008, a year ahead of schedule (except for the central government’s revenue deficit 
target). The combined fiscal deficit came down to 4.2% of GDP in 2007–2008 (well below 
the prescribed 6.0%) and the primary deficit (fiscal deficit net of interest payments) turned 
into a surplus of 1.3% of GDP in 2007–2008. 
However, there is a lot of disagreement among policy-makers about targeting  a  zero 
revenue deficit in India, for the reason that it sounds unrealistic to target a zero revenue 
deficit and a 3% fiscal deficit because this implicitly assumes that revenue expenditure does 
not contribute to growth. For a developing country, it may be argued that it is desirable to 
target a small revenue surplus to finance capital formation rather than target a zero revenue 
deficit. This means the government would be saving and contributing to capital formation 
(Chelliah 2000). Public finance experts like Dr. Chelliah have also questioned the wisdom of 
setting a 3% fiscal deficit target. He says, “… 3% is too low for a developing country as the 
government still has to spend large amounts of money on infrastructure investment, 
including social infrastructure such as hospitals and schools.” 
Figure 3.1 provides a synoptic view of fiscal trends from 1990–1991, the year in which India 
faced its economic crisis. There was a steady improvement in central and state finances 
from 2001–2002, when the fiscal and revenue deficits of the combined central and state 
governments had peaked at 9.9% and 7.0% of GDP respectively. 
Figure 3.1: Fiscal Indicators of the Combined Central and State Governments (%GDP) 
 
Source: RBI, various issues. 
3.2  Debt Sustainability 
The trends in fiscal deficit were mirrored in the rising public debt levels. The combined debt 
of the central and state governments, which averaged 56% of GDP in the 1980s, rose to an 
average of slightly over 63% in the 1990s and climbed further to touch a peak of 81.4% in 
2003–2004 (see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2). A notable feature was the drastic reduction in the 
share of the external liabilities to GDP from 6.7% (on the average) in 1980s to 1.7% in 2003–ADBI Working Paper No. 249    Kumar and Soumya 
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2004
4. After the introduction of the FRBM Act, public debt steadily declined until 2008–2009, 
when it stood at 74.7%. The concern now is that the high fiscal deficits of the past two years 
may suggest a long-term reversal of this trend. Budget estimates for 2009–2010 indicate an 
increase in the public debt to above 75% (about Rs 44,000 billion). It could be even higher if 
GDP growth slows down further.
5
These trends also point to one of the main deficiencies in the FRBM Act, namely the failure 
to set a cap on public debt. There is little doubt that the FRBM Act put the country on a 
higher growth trajectory by reducing the fiscal and primary deficits, but a sound fiscal system 
also needs to have in place measures to control the debt to GDP ratio. We hope the next set 
of FRBM targets include policies towards reducing public debt. 
 This also may reverse the downward movement in the 
public debt to GDP ratio in India, which has been achieved over the last few of years.  
The rise in public debt can be attributed to the sharp rise in the primary deficit (i.e. fiscal 
deficit minus interest payments). The basic rule is that the ratio of debt to GDP will keep 
rising if there is a primary deficit or if the interest rate on debt exceeds the growth rate of 
GDP. With the fall in the GDP growth rate because of the global financial crisis, concerns 
regarding the sustainability of such high levels of public debt have become stronger. Should 
economic growth slow down because of the crisis, debt servicing could pose a problem as 
interest rates decline only with a lag, which would result in a further deterioration in 
government finances. This may also point towards the need to adopt an early exit from the 
high fiscal deficit regime 
                                                 
4 Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) found inter alia that countries with a higher aggregate public debt to 
GDP ratio and higher share of external debt in the total public debt were more likely to default on their debt 
servicing (International Monetary Fund [IMF] 2003). In this respect, India has a major advantage of having a 
very low share of external debt in total public debt with external debt being only 5% of GDP. 
5 ICRIER estimated GDP growth for the year 2009–2010 to be between 6.5–6.8% and inflation to be 4.0–5.0%. 
Therefore the nominal growth rate would be 10.50% as compared to 10.97% estimated by the Finance Ministry 
for the 2009–2010 budget. 
 ADBI Working Paper No. 249    Kumar and Soumya 
7 



























24.7  41.2  6.7  47.9  20.7  56.0 
1990–
1999 
27.4  48.0  4.5  52.5  22.4  63.2 
2000–
2001 
38.2  52.4  3.1  55.6  28.3  70.6 
2001–
2002 
40.0  56.8  3.1  59.9  30.3  76.0 
2002–
2003 
41.5  61.0  2.4  63.4  32.0  80.2 
2003–
2004 
41.4  61.4  1.7  63.0  33.2  81.4 
2004–
2005 
40.5  61.4  1.9  63.3  32.7  81.3 
2005–
2006 
38.7  60.4  2.6  63.0  32.6  80.3 
2006–
2007 
37.4  59.0  2.5  61.5  30.3  77.3 
2007–
2008 
38.3  57.7  2.4  60.1  27.8  75.1 
2008–
2009 RE 
37.8  56.6  2.3  58.9  27.1  74.7 
2009–
2010 BE 
40.2  57.2  2.3  59.9  27.6  76.5 
RE: Revised Estimates 
BE: Budget Estimates 
Source: RBI, various issues. 
There is little consensus on what the ideal debt to GDP ratio for an economy should be. 
Internationally, the Maastricht Treaty has set the tolerable debt level at around 60% of GDP 
for the European Union countries. The Twelfth Finance Commission had recommended an 
even lower target of 56% over a period for India. To this end, it had also recommended that 
the ratio be brought down to at least 75% by 2009–2010.  
If one goes by the budget estimates for 2009–2010, the government is quite clearly not 
going to be able to meet the target. The primary deficit, which as Rangarajan and Srivastava 
(2005)
7 pointed out was the core variable that led to an increase in public debt to GDP ratio 
in the period 1951–2003, turned positive in 2008–2009. The gross primary deficit rose from -
1.3% in 2007–2008 to 3.5% in 2008–2009 and is expected to rise further to 4.6% in 2009–
2010. Since capital expenditure has been declining over this period, it is apparent that the 
main factor accounting  for the rise in the gross primary deficit is increased  revenue 
expenditures for both the central and state governments. 
                                                 
6 Outstanding liabilities (public debt) are comprised of the internal (market borrowings, RBI treasury bills, small 
savings and deposits, provident funds, and reserve funds) and external liabilities. 
7 Rangarajan (2003) has found that during the 1970s and 1990s a negligible increase was seen in the debt to 
GDP ratio because nearly 100% of the impact of the primary deficit was absorbed by the growth-interest 
differential. 
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Figure 3.2: Debt of the Central and State Governments (As % of GDP) 
 
Source: RBI, various issues. 
3.3  Receipts and Disbursement of the Government 
3.3.1  Central and State Governments’ Expenditure  
At the central level, average government expenditure
8 stood at 17.6% of GDP in the 1980s 
(see Appendix 1). The share fell by 1.6% immediately after the reforms, mainly because of 
the macroeconomic stabilization program that followed the 1991 BOP crisis. However, a 
sharp rise in salaries and pensions following the acceptance of the Fifth Pay Commission 
report
9
After the FRBM was passed, central government’s total expenditure fell from approximately 
16%  to 14%  of GDP over the next two years. However, this expenditure control was 
achieved by cutting down capital expenditure sharply while revenue expenditure showed 
only a marginal decline. Thus, the composition of government expenditure, which has 
 in 1996–1997 pushed the expenditure level back to the 16–17% level the following 
year—a level at which it stayed until the FRBM Act in 2004–2005.  
                                                 
8 Government expenditure consists of revenue and capital expenditures (mostly public investment). The major 
components of government revenue expenditure are interest payments on debt and subsidies. 
9 Acharya (2001) describes the effects of the Fifth Pay Commission for government employees as “the single 
largest adverse shock” to public finances in the 1990s. His estimates indicate that compensation to employees 
(including pension) by central and state governments accounted for about half of the fiscal deficit increase of 
three percentage points of GDP during 1997–1999. ADBI Working Paper No. 249    Kumar and Soumya 
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always been a matter of concern, remains unchanged with revenue expenditure accounting 
for about 80% of total expenditures.
10
Public capital expenditure as a percentage of GDP declined from an average of 6.2% in the 
1980s to 3.6%  in 2004–2005 and further to 1.8%  in 2008–2009. By contrast, revenue 
expenditure, which was 11.4% of GDP during the 1980s, rose to 12.2% in 2004–2005 and to 
15.1% in 2008–2009.  
  
As in the mid-1990s, the reason for the sharp rise in revenue expenditure in 2008–2009 has 
been the implementation of the recommendations of the Sixth Pay Commission Report and 
measures such as the debt waiver on farm loans and subsidies. Interest payments, which 
account for over 30% of revenue expenditure, stood at about 4% of GDP until 2004–2005. 
However, these came down to 3.6% in 2005–2006 and continued at the same level until 
2008–2009. This, however, was not really the result of a reduction in borrowings but rather 
an effect of softening of interest rates.  
The other major item of revenue expenditure has been subsidies. Budget data do not 
indicate the actual expenditure on subsidies because several subsidies are hidden in the 
production of intermediate goods and services and the quantum of subsidy at the stage of 
final consumption of goods or services is not clearly known (Radhakrishna  and  Panda 
2006)
11
Food subsidy as a percentage of GDP rose from 0.4% in 1990–1991 to 0.9% in 2003–2004. 
This has decreased since 2003–2004 and reached 0.6% in 2006–2007. However it started 
rising again in 2007–2008 (see Table 3.3)
. Explicit government budgetary subsidies like those on food, fertilizers,  and 
petroleum products are only a small portion of the total subsidy.  
12
                                                 
10 The remaining 20% is the capital expenditure. 
, partly due to enhanced food security measures 
with a higher subsidy for the poor. A part of this rise in subsidy is due to the high minimum 
support price for food grain procurement and the inefficient operation of the Food 
Corporation of India. This indicates scope for reducing subsidy without hurting the poor 
(Radhakrishna and Panda 2006). The government has recently taken some measures to 
make the food subsidy more target-group  oriented by revamping the public distribution 
system and introducing differential prices for the poor and non-poor groups. Food subsidy 
has increased further and reached 0.9% of GDP in 2009–2010. Fertilizer subsidies have 
gradually increased to 0.7% of GDP in 2007–2008 and further shot up to 1.4% of GDP in 
2008–2009, whereas petroleum subsidies were constant at 0.1% of GDP until 2009–2010.  
11  Several studies have attempted to make a comprehensive estimate of implicit and explicit subsidies by central 
and state governments. All these studies pertain to the late 1980s and 1990s. The estimated figures are high 
at about 12–13.5% of GDP during the period (e.g., Mundle and Rao 1992; National Institute of Public Finance 
and Policy (NIPFP),1997). 
12 The figures given in Table 3.3 are the subsidies that are included in the budget. There are off-budget subsidies 
given on food, fertilizer, and petroleum.  
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1.6  1.5  1.3  1.4  1.5  2.4  1.9 
Food 
0.9  0.8  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9 
  Fertilizer 
0.4  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.7  1.4  0.8 
  Petroleum 
0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
 
RE: Revised Estimates 
BE: Budget Estimates 
Source: RBI, various issues. 
More importantly, the growing practice of issuing special bonds to oil and fertilizer 
companies to support low consumer prices means that at least part of the subsidy burden is 
off the budget. While these subsidies do not appear in the budget, they do result in additional 
costs and risk for the government.
13
Expenditures at the state level exhibit a trend similar to those at the central level. From an 
average of roughly 15.5% of GDP in the 1980s and 1990s, the total state-level expenditures 
rose to nearly 18.0% in 2004–2005 (see Appendix 2). While expenditures fell steadily for the 
next three years to 15.5% in 2007–2008 on account of the Twelfth Finance Commission 
measures, they rose again to 17.3% in 2008–2009. Budget estimates indicate that the level 
for 2009–2010 will climb back to the 2004–2005 level. 
 Oil subsides, which are included in off-budget bonds, 
not only affect the liquidity position but also change the fiscal position of the government 
itself. The off-budget expenditure incurred by the government has almost doubled to 1.80% 
of the GDP (Rs 970.19 billion) in 2008–2009 from 0.98% (Rs 403.61 billion) in 2006–2007.  
An increase in revenue expenditure also accounted for the  rise in states’ expenditure. 
Between 2004 and 2005, there was some reduction in revenue expenditure but the trend 
reversed in 2008–2009 and it is expected to touch a high of 14% in 2009–2010. Capital 
expenditure has shown a more fluctuating trend. In the immediate post-reform period, there 
was a sharp drop in states’ capital expenditures. This was an unhealthy development, 
because by reducing capital expenditure to achieve fiscal balance, they had effectively 
compromised on building the infrastructure capacity needed to promote growth. There was a 
moderate increase in states’ capital expenditure in the three-year period from 2002–2004 but 
it slipped again thereafter. However, it has since increased from 3.5% in 2007–2008 to 3.9% 
in 2008–2009. 
3.3.2  Central and State Governments’ Receipts 
The persistent fiscal expenditures reveal that total receipts of both the central and  state 
governments have remained consistently below total expenditures. Tax receipts, which 
contribute the bulk of the central government revenues, fell sharply in the period following 
the introduction of the reforms in 1992. This was the result of the rationalization of the tax 
structure. Total tax revenue as a proportion of GDP declined from 10.3% in 1990–1991 to 
the lowest level of 8.2% in 1998–1999. It was only in 2005–2006 that tax revenue touched 
the level it was at in 1990–1991 (see Appendix 1). Tax receipts rose to 12.6% in 2007–2008 
but again declined to 11.8% in 2008–2009.  
                                                 




The Chelliah Committee (1992: 4) had, in its interim report, recommended that as a first step 
towards the rationalization of the personal income tax structure a three-rate slab structure 
should be introduced and later replaced by a two-rate structure. Further, the committee 
suggested reducing corporate income taxes. Both the recommendations were accepted and 
implemented in 1992. The maximum marginal rate of personal income tax was reduced to 
40% from 56% in June 1991. Further, rates of corporate income tax, which were 51.8% for a 
publicly listed company and 57.5% for a closely held company, were unified and reduced to 
46.0% in 1992. These rates were inclusive of a 15% surcharge.  
 initiated since 1991 were part of the structural reform process after the 
1991 economic crisis. The Tax Reforms Committee (TRC) concentrated on finding a suitable 
framework to reform both the direct and indirect tax structure. The committee recommended 
two major reforms on direct taxes—one was the simplification and rationalization of the 
direct tax structure (Chelliah 1992); the other was to introduce a service tax to widen the tax 
base (Chelliah 1994).  
The 1992 reforms radically altered the composition of tax revenue at the central level
15. 
Direct taxes as a percentage of GDP rose from 2.0% in the 1980s to 6.5% in 2008–2009. 
However, this rise in the proportion of direct taxes was offset by a reduction in central 
indirect tax revenues as a percentage of GDP from 7.9% to 5.3% over the same period. The 
share of non-tax revenue
16
The government also introduced a service tax in 1994 in line with the recommendations of 
the Chelliah Committee
 in GDP at the central level fluctuated between 2.0–3.0% during 
1980–2009 with the 3.0% recorded in 2001–2002 and lowest 1.8% observed in 2008–2009. 
17
Major changes on the indirect tax side included a sharp reduction in import duties from 
extremely high levels to a range of 15–30% for manufacturers, reduction of multiple excise 
tax rates to three in the range of 10–20%, and extension of the then existing modified value 
added tax (MODVAT)
. Until then, the service sector had been totally left out of the tax net 
though the sector’s contribution to GDP had risen to 36% by 1993–1994. Starting with three 
services, viz.,namely telephone, stock broking, and insurance services, the coverage has 
progressively widened over the years with about 80 services having been brought within the 
ambit of taxation tillto date. A few important services brought under the service tax net are 
banking and other financial services, management consultants, credit rating agencies, and 
market research agencies. Some important services that are still outside of the tax net are 
legal consultancy services, transport of goods by waterways,  and  cosmetic or plastic 
surgery. The rate imposed originally was a moderate 5% of turnover. This was, however, 
progressively increased to 12% and an additional education tax of 2% on service tax was 
imposed in 2006–2007. The 2008 crisis, however, forced a rollback in the service tax rate to 
10% in February 2009. Collections from service tax have shown a steady rise from 1994–
1995 (0.2% of GDP) to 2008–2009 (1.1% of GDP). However, in 2008–2009, they accounted 
for only 10.4% of the total tax receipts of the central government while the share of services 
in total GDP has gone up to 57%.  
18
                                                 
14 The list of fiscal reforms mainly on taxation is given in Appendix 3. 
 credit to all inputs. In 2000–2001, the government converted the 
three excise duties into a single central value added tax (CENVAT), levied at the rate of 
16%. Subsequently, state-level value added tax (VAT) replaced CENVAT in 2005–2006 
15 Direct taxes contribute a negligible amount to state revenues. 
16 Non-tax revenue includes interest receipts, income from property, etc. 
17The objectives of levying a service tax are: (i) shrinking of the tax base as the share of industry in GDP 
decreases while that of services expands, (ii) failure to tax services distorts consumer choices and encourages 
spending on services at the expense of goods, (iii) untaxed service traders are unable to claim VAT on service 
inputs, which encourages businesses to develop in-house services, creating further distortions, and (iv) most of 
the services that are likely to become taxable are positively correlated with expenditure of high-income 
households and, therefore, service tax improves equity (Annual Report, RBI 2003–2004). 
18 Under the MODVAT, a manufacturer can obtain credit for excise tax paid on capital goods and on inputs used 
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though initially only 20 states accepted the proposal. The acceptability of the VAT has gone 
up to 28 states to date. Four slabs of VAT have been uniformly applied across all states that 
adopted it—0.0% on necessities and primary goods, 1.0% on bullion and precious stones, 
4.0% on industrial inputs and capital goods and items of mass consumption, and 12.5% on 
all other items. Necessities and primary products were left out of the ambit of VAT. 
The government now intends to move to a goods and services tax (GST) regime, which will 
replace state-level VAT and CENVAT. The tax will be imposed on final goods and services 
with a two-rate structure. The GST, which is being steered by an empowered committee of 
state finance ministers, was expected to be launched in April 2010. Its introduction will most 
likely be delayed until October 2010. This will mark a major step in unifying the tax regime 
across the country and do away with tax arbitrage that currently disturbs investment 
decisions. 
Figure 3.3: Direct and Indirect Taxes and Non-tax Revenues of the Central 
Government 
(As a % of GDP) 
 
Source: RBI, various issues. 
At the state level, fiscal health depends both on  revenues from state taxes as well as 
constitutional and other transfers from the central government. There is a three-tier transfer 
mechanism in India. First, the Indian Constitution provides for mandatory transfer of revenue 
from central taxes on the basis of the recommendation of a Finance Commission that the 
central government is required to set up every five years. Each Finance Commission uses 
different criteria to transfer funds. Second, there are budgetary transfers made through the 
Planning Commission to implement plan projects
19
A look at the revenue receipts of states shows that there was a steady improvement in the 
tax ratio during the study period. The revenue from states’ tax receipts (including their share 
. Third, there are optional transfers 
through various union ministries and agencies. Fund transfers from the central government 
form a large part of revenue of the state governments. These transfers are accounted for in 
a state’s revenue receipts. There are several issues related to the transparency of central 
government transfers and accounting problems. The discussion about these problems is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
                                                 
19 The Planning Commission transfers resources on the basis of population, per capita income, tax effort, fiscal 
management, literacy, land reform, and other factors. The planning commission uses a formula where 30% of 
the transfers are in the form of grants and 70% as loans. States cannot accept grants without taking loans. 
Thus grants and loans are tied together.  ADBI Working Paper No. 249    Kumar and Soumya 
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in the central pool) as a ratio of GDP was virtually stagnant throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
at around 7.7% (see Appendix 2). There was some decline from 1994–1995 and the low 
point of 7.2% was reached in 1998–1999, the year in which the states had to revise their pay 
scales, which  exacerbated their fiscal problems. The pay revision in 1997–1998 created 
more fiscal stress for state governments as revealed by the increase in their revenue deficit 
from 0.9% of GDP in 1990–1991 to 2.6% in 2000–2001. The extent of the stress on state 
budgets can be gauged from the fact that, since the mid-1990s, salaries and pensions 
account for 80–90% of revenue receipts in most states. However, the tax ratio has steadily 
improved from 7.8% in 2000–2001 and reached 9.6% in 2008–2009.  
A major development at the state level is the adoption of VAT from 2005–2006. The VAT 
would help to remove the cascading tax burden. Tax revenue
20
3.3.3  Combined Receipts and Disbursement 
 is expected to rise as 
compliance improves under VAT. The state VAT has evidently helped tax revenues to 
increase from 8.6% in 2005–2006 to 9.6% in 2008–2009. 
Taking the budgetary position of the central government and states together, one finds that 
the combined expenditure as a percentage of GDP rose from 26.8% in the 1990s to 27.4% 
in 2007–2008 (see Table 3.4). The subsequent two years show a sharp rise in expenditures, 
with the budget estimates for 2009–2010 showing expenditure at almost 32% of GDP. This 
has been a consequence of a sharp increase in public expenditure in the run up to the 
general elections of 2009–2010. 
Total receipts have also shown a similar increase from around 26% to roughly 31% from the 
1990’s to 2008–2009 (see Table 3.4). Over 60% of receipts are accounted for by revenue 
receipts (both tax and non-tax). The rest has come from capital receipts of which the two 
major components have been debt capital receipts (mainly borrowings) and disinvestment.  
The share of the central government’s capital receipts
21 in GDP was just above 6% until 
2000–2001 and thereafter increased until 2003–2004. Since then, it declined reaching 3.6% 
in 2007–2008. As Table 3.4 indicates, debt capital receipts have been the major contributor 
to capital receipts. The contribution from disinvestment has been about 1–2%  of capital 
receipts in the post-reform period. Disinvestment was the highest in 2003–2004, amounting 
to Rs 169.53 billion (0.6% of GDP). However, it did not pick up momentum till until 2007–
2008
22 where the disinvestment receipts were Rs 457.50 billion (about 1% of GDP)
23
                                                 
20 The states receive about 30% of total tax collection from the central government from the shareable common 
pool according to the norms prescribed by the Finance Commission.  
.  
21 Capital receipts consist of debt and non-debt capital receipts of the central government. Disinvestment receipts 
are considered to be the important non-debt capital receipts from 1991–1992. 
22 From 2005–2006 disinvestment proceedings of the government includes sale of ‘land and property’ and debt 
relief. 
23 With the setting up of National Investment Fund (NIF), all proceeds from disinvestment of Central Public Sector 
Enterprises (CPSEs) are required to be routed to it, which is maintained outside the Consolidated Fund of 
India. (Annual Reports, RBI).  
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Table 3.4: Combined Receipts and Disbursement of the Central and State 
Governments (As a % of GDP) 





































Total Expenditure  28.8  26.8  28.3  28.6  28.7  28.9  27.6  26.8  26.9  27.4  31.2  31.9 
Revenue Expenditure  20.7  22.3  24.6  24.5  25.1  24.6  23.2  22.5  22.6  22.4  26.3  27.1 
Interest Payments  3.1  5.0  5.9  6.2  6.5  6.4  6.1  5.7  5.6  5.5  5.4  5.6 
Capital Expenditure  8.1  4.5  3.7  4.1  3.6  4.3  4.4  4.3  4.3  5.0  4.9  4.8 
Capital Outlay  -  -  -  2.6  2.7  3.1  3.6  3.7  3.8  4.7  4.4  4.5 
Loans and Advances  -  -  -  1.2  0.9  1.2  0.8  0.6  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.3 
Total Receipts  27.1  26.0  28.5  28.5  28.8  29.0  28.2  28.3  27.3  27.8  30.9  31.4 
Revenue Receipts  18.9  18.1  18.0  17.5  18.5  18.8  19.5  19.7  21.2  22.2  21.9  21.6 
Tax Revenues  15.0  14.6  14.5  13.8  14.6  15.1  15.7  16.3  17.5  18.5  18.1  17.5 
Direct Taxes  2.5  3.2  3.8  3.6  4.1  4.6  5.0  5.4  6.5  7.5  7.4  7.4 
Indirect Taxes  12.5  11.4  10.7  10.2  10.5  10.5  10.7  10.9  11.0  11.0  10.7  10.1 
Non-Tax Revenues  3.9  3.5  3.5  3.8  3.9  3.7  3.9  3.3  3.7  3.7  3.8  4.2 
Capital Receipts  8.2  7.9  10.5  11.0  10.3  10.2  8.7  8.6  6.0  5.6  9.0  9.8 
Debt Capital Receipts  -  -  -  10.2  9.7  8.6  8.0  8.2  6.0  4.5  8.6  9.6 
Non-Debt Capital 
Receipts 
-  -  -  0.80  0.65  1.57  0.62  0.37  0.04  1.07  0.40  0.17 
Disinvestment 
Proceeds 
-  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.6  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.96  0.2  0.0 
Revenue Deficit  1.8  4.2  6.6  7.0  6.6  5.8  3.6  2.8  1.3  0.2  4.4  5.5 
Gross Fiscal Deficit  8.0  7.7  9.5  9.9  9.6  8.5  7.5  6.7  5.6  4.2  8.9  10.2 
Gross Primary Deficit  4.9  2.7  3.6  3.7  3.1  2.1  1.3  1.0  0.0  -1.3  3.5  4.6 
Notes: RE: Revised Estimates; BE: Budget Estimates  
Source: RBI, various issues. 
3.4  Public Sector Savings and Investment
 24
The deterioration in the fiscal position of the central and state governments has impacted 




The 1980–2009 period also saw a rapid decline in public sector investment, especially in the 
infrastructure and agriculture sectors. The fall was particularly sharp after the 1991 reforms. 
Since  state governments in India typically handle  both agriculture and infrastructure, 
 averaged just above 3.5% in the 1980s (see Table 3.5). This had reduced to an 
average of 1.5% in the 1990s. Public sector savings deteriorated further in the period after 
reforms were initiated, turning negative (-1.8%) in 2000–2001. Though there was some 
improvement in 2002–2003, public sector savings turned positive again only in 2003–2004, a 
trend that was maintained until 2008–2009. They peaked in 2007–2008 reaching 4.5% of 
GDP. There was a sharp deterioration in 2008–2009 when public sector savings turned 
negative at -1.8%. Budget estimates for 2009–2010 indicate a further deterioration.  
                                                 
24 The public sector includes administrative departments, department enterprises, non-departmental enterprises, 
and quasi-government bodies. The data is available for quasi-government bodies from 1993–1994 only. 
25 The percentage share of public sector output in the total GDP was fluctuating between 20–30% in the 1980s 
and 1990s. It has been stagnant at just above 20% since 2005–2006. ADBI Working Paper No. 249    Kumar and Soumya 
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declining public sector investment reflects in part the deterioration in the fiscal position of 
state governments.  
Concern remains that high fiscal deficits would crowd out private investment by keeping 
interest rates high in the short-term. In the long term, the lack of critical investments would 
prevent the crowding in effect from becoming operative. A growing fiscal deficit will, 
therefore, adversely impact both the long and short-term growth prospects of the economy.  
Table 3.5: Public Sector Savings and Investment
26
Year 
 (As % of GDP) 
Public Investment  Public Savings 
1980–1989  10.6  3.7 
1990–1999  8.5  1.5 
2000–2001  6.9  -1.8 
2001–2002  6.9  -2.0 
2002–2003  6.1  -0.6 
2003–2004  6.3  1.1 
2004–2005  6.9  2.2 
2005–2006  7.6  2.4 
2006–2007  8.0  3.3 
2007–2008  9.1  4.5 
2008–2009 RE  6.9  -1.8 
2009–2010 BE  6.9  -2.0 
RE: Revised Estimates 
BE: Budget Estimates 
Source: National Accounts Statistics, various issues. 
3.5  Structural and Cyclical Behavior of Major Fiscal Variables 
3.5.1  Relationship Between Gross Fiscal Deficit and Growth 
The relationship between the fiscal deficit and output growth has been of enduring interest 
for the Indian economy. In Figure 3.4, the annual data of the combined gross fiscal deficit 
(GFD) of both the central and state governments is plotted against GDP at market prices 
from 1980–1981 to 2009–2010 (BE Budget Estimates). Until 2002–2003, there appeared to 
be considerable long-run coordinate movement between these two series. This indicates 
that the relationship is structural rather than cyclical. However, for a short period over 2006–
2007 and 2007–2008, fiscal deficit decreased as the output increased.  This negative 
relationship could be attributed to the implementation and realization of FRBM targets. There 
is a sudden jump in fiscal deficit in 2008–2009 and 2009–2010 (BE), though output has 
grown at a slower pace
27
                                                 
26 The difference between public investment and public savings does not equal to fiscal deficit as the definition of 
public sector also includes non-departmental enterprises. Savings and investment of administrative departments 
and departmental enterprises are more directly related to fiscal deficit, and its impact on growth.  
, making the association between GFD and GDP horizontal in 
2008–2009 and 2009–2010. Nonetheless, there is an upward linear trend exhibited 
throughout the study period implying a positive relation between fiscal deficit and output 
growth.  
27 The slower growth in output is due to current global crisis and the sudden rise in fiscal deficit is due to salary 
hike and debt waiver schemes, fiscal stimulus packages, and other fiscal factors. 
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Interestingly, we find different results altogether when gross fiscal deficit as a share of GDP 
is plotted. Figure 3.5 shows the gross fiscal deficit as a share of GDP. The relative growth of 
GFD to GDP exhibits cyclical behavior through the study period. The cycle does not seem to 
coincide with the electoral cycle but the peaks coincide exactly with the pay commission 
recommendations
28 and the troughs coincide with fiscal reforms
29
Figure 3.4: Scatter Plot of Combined GFD and GDP 
.  
 
 Source: RBI, various issues. 
                                                 
28 Fourth Pay Commission in 1986–1987, Fifth Pay Commission in 1997–1998, and Sixth Pay Commission in 
2008–2009. 
29 Economic reforms in 1991–1992, tax reforms in 1992–1993, and FRBM Act in 2004–2005. ADBI Working Paper No. 249    Kumar and Soumya 
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Figure 3.5: Combined GFD as a Share of GDP (%) 
 
Source: RBI, various issues. 
As discussed earlier in the paper, the relationship between the size of fiscal deficit and GDP 
growth has been an intensely debated one. There are those who believe in its “crowding in” 
effect in a developing economy. Their view is contrasted by others who see a high fiscal 
deficit as pre-empting domestic savings and discouraging private investment, resulting in a 
“crowding out” phenomenon. We have tried to test the validity of these arguments, by trying 
to quantify the relationship between GDP growth and fiscal deficit taken as a percentage of 
GDP. We estimated the simple equation given below. 
 1. Gr GDP = 8.63 + 0.07 Gr GCF - 0.41 GFD/GDPM
30
                       (3.8)     (1.8)                (-1.5)                   
  
       R
2 = 0.17    DW = 1.92 
Equation 1 yields a negative correlation, though a weak one, between GDP growth and fiscal 
deficit as a percentage of GDP. This substantiates the argument made by several Indian 
economists (Govinda Rao 2009; Rangarajan 2009). 
But the long run relationship between GDP and fiscal deficit, using the logarithm of both to 
avoid non-stationarity problem, is surprisingly a positive one as given by Equation 2.  
2. Log GDP = 1.28 + 0.64 Log GCF + 0.19 Log GFDR + 0.39 AR (1) 
                      (2.6)    (15.9)                   (3.4)                    (2.0) 
       R
2 = 0.99    DW = 2.1 
                                                 
30 GDP = gross domestic product at constant factor prices, GDPM = gross domestic product at current 
market prices, GCF = real gross capital formation, GFD = gross fiscal deficit, GFDR= gross fiscal 
deficit in constant prices, Gr indicates growth rate. 
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Apparently in conditions of unemployed resources and rising demand, an expansion in 
public expenditure, even when it increases the fiscal deficit, results in the positive impact of 
“crowding in” swamping the negative effect.
31
3.5.2  Relationship Between Public Debt and Growth 
  
Annual data on the combined outstanding liabilities and GDP at current market prices from 
1980–1981 to 2009–2010 (BE) is plotted in Figure 3.6. The scatter graph below depicts 
trends that are similar to that in the case of the fiscal deficit throughout the study period, 
confirming the structural behavior of public debt over decades. It shows that there is a 
positive relation between GDP and public debt from 1980s. However, there seems to be a 
marginal downturn from 2007–2008 to 2009–2010, implying rising public debt has had a 
negative impact in recent years.  
Figure 3.6: Scatter Plot of Combined Outstanding Liabilities and GDP  
 
Source: RBI, various issues. 
4.  GLOBAL CRISIS AND INDIA’S FISCAL DEFICIT 
The deviations seen in the structural relationship between the GDP and GFD in 2008–2009 
and 2009–2010 can be attributed to the impact of the global economic crisis.  
4.1  Global Financial Crisis 
The sub-prime crisis that emanated from the United States (US) has led to liquidity and 
solvency problems all around the world. Even though India, like other developing countries, 
did not have direct exposure to the crisis, the effects have been felt through credit, exports, 
and exchange rate channels. India’s engagement with the global economy has deepened 
since the 1990s, making it vulnerable to global financial and economic crises. The impact of 
the current global crisis has been transmitted to the Indian economy through three distinct 
channels, namely, the financial sector, exports, and exchange rates (Kumar 2009). However, 
four factors helped India to cope with the crisis and soften its impact. They are: (1) the 
                                                 
31 However, there appears to be a relatively high correlation between GCF and GFDR, which dilutes 
the validity of the long run equation. 
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robust, well-capitalized and well-regulated financial sector; (2) the  gradual and cautious 
opening up of the capital account; (3) the large stock of foreign reserves, and (4) a greater 
dependence on domestic consumption as a driver of GDP growth. Consumption accounted 
for more than 70% of India’s GDP and GDP growth was 7.3% during 2000–2007. India’s 
GDP growth declined to 5.8% (year-on-year) in the second half of 2008–2009 from 7.8% in 
the first half. The growth improved to 6.1%  in the first quarter of 2009–2010.  ICRIER 
estimates the GDP growth rate for the Indian economy is likely to be between 6.5–6.8% in 
2009–2010. 
The contagion from the global financial crisis warranted appropriate monetary and fiscal 
policy responses to ensure enough liquidity in the economy, the orderly functioning of 
markets,  and financial stability. Given the role of fiscal measures to fight the economic 
slowdown, the government’s ability to raise resources for spending and the economy’s 
existing fiscal health, there is need to study the viability of fiscal stimulus in India. In this 
section, we discuss the Indian fiscal response to the current crisis and attempt projections of 
fiscal deficit and public debt to check for their sustainability in coming years.  
4.2  Trends in Fiscal Indicators in 2008–2009 and 2009–2010 
As discussed above, India’s fiscal situation improved significantly after the adoption of FRBM 
targets by successive governments since 2003–2004 until the global crisis hit the Indian 
economy in early 2008–2009. The high rate of GDP growth, which averaged 8.7% between 
2003–2004 and 2008–2009, also contributed to revenue buoyancy and helped bring down 
both revenue and fiscal deficits.  
The combined fiscal deficit in 2007–2008 was just about 4% and revenue deficit was very 
close to zero along with a primary surplus. However, the situation changed drastically in 
2008–2009. The central budget  in  2008–2009, announced in February 2008, seemed to 
continue the progress towards FRBM targets by showing a low fiscal deficit of 2.5% of GDP. 
However, the 2008–2009 budget quite clearly made inadequate allowances for rural 
schemes like the farm loan waiver and the expansion of  social security schemes under 
the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), the Sixth Pay Commission award 
and subsidies for food, fertilizer, and petroleum. These together pushed up the fiscal deficit 
sharply to higher levels. There were also off-budget items like the issue of oil and fertilizer 
bonds, which should be added to give a true picture of fiscal deficit in 2008–2009. The fiscal 
deficit shot up to 8.9% of GDP (10.7% including off-budget bonds) against 5.0% in 2007–
2008 and the primary surplus turned into a deficit of 3.5% of GDP (see Table 4.1). The 
combined public debt, however, declined marginally to 74.7% of GDP because of a nominal 
growth in GDP of 12.7%. The revenue deficit increased substantially to 4.4% in 2008–2009. 
The huge increase in public expenditure in 2008–2009 of 31.2% that followed a 27.4% in 
2007–2008 was driven by the electoral cycle with parliamentary elections scheduled within a 
year of the announcement of the budget. The budget’s fiscal expansion helped compensate 
the effect of monetary tightening and push up domestic demand, especially in the rural 
sector. This prevented a collapse in domestic demand when Indian exports suffered a huge 
collapse starting November 2008 in the wake of the global crisis. Therefore, it is important to 
include fiscal expansion undertaken by the Indian government in February 2008 as a part of 
the fiscal stimulus undertaken in response to the post-Lehman Brothers crisis.  
Budget estimates for 2009–2010 indicate a further worsening with the fiscal and primary 
deficits rising in the current year. Fiscal and primary deficits are expected to be 10.2% and 
4.5% of GDP respectively and the debt
32
                                                 
32 The total outstanding liabilities of the central government as per 2009–2010 (BE) is about Rs 3,400 billion 
(59.6% of the GDP) of which internal debt accounts for 67.0%. Adding the state governments’ outstanding 
 ratio is likely to deteriorate to 76.6% of the GDP. 
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Table 4.1: Receipts and Disbursement of the Central and State Governments 
(As a % of GDP) 




























Total Expenditure  27.4  31.2  31.9  15.1  16.9  17.4  15.5  17.3  17.7 
 Revenue Expenditure  22.4  26.3  27.1  12.6  15.1  15.3  12.0  13.4  14.0 
 Capital Expenditure  5.0  4.9  4.8  2.5  1.8  2.1  3.5  3.9  3.6 
Total Receipts  27.8  30.9  31.4  18.3  20.0  20.2  15.8  17.0  17.1 
 Revenue Receipts  22.2  21.9  21.6  14.7  13.6  13.3  12.9  13.6  13.4 
  Tax Revenues  18.5  18.1  17.5  12.6  11.8  10.9  9.3  9.6  - 
  Non-Tax Revenues  3.7  3.8  4.2  2.2  1.8  2.4  4.0  3.9  - 
 Capital Receipts  5.6  9.0  9.8  3.6  6.4  6.9  2.9  3.4  3.7 
Revenue Deficit  0.2  4.4  5.5  1.1  4.5  4.8  -0.9  -0.1  0.6 
Gross Fiscal Deficit  4.2  8.9  10.2  2.7  6.1  6.8  1.4  2.7  3.4 
Gross Primary  
Deficit 
-1.3  3.5  4.6  -0.9  2.5  3.0  -0.6  0.7  1.4 
RE: Revised Estimates 
BE: Budget Estimates 
Source: RBI, various issues 
The measures taken by the government to counter the effects of the global meltdown on the 
Indian economy have resulted in a shortfall in revenues and substantial increases in 
government expenditures, leading to a temporary deviation in 2008–2009 and 2009–2010 
from the fiscal consolidation path mandated under the FRBM Act. The revenue deficit and 
fiscal deficit in 2009–2010 BE are, as a result, higher than the targets set under the FRBM 
Act and Rules. The combined government expenditure was 31.2% of GDP in 2008–2009 
and is expected to increase to 31.9% in 2009–2010 (Table 4.1). The combined revenue 
expenditure is estimated to increase from 26.3%  in 2008–2009 to 27.1%  in 2009–2010. 
Owing to policy interventions for inflation management and subsequently for providing a 
stimulus to growth, the government had to forego substantial revenues from excise and 
customs duties. Consequently, despite the buoyancy of direct tax revenues and service tax 
collections, the fiscal consolidation process has received a setback. The combined tax 
revenue of both the central and state governments is expected to come down by 0.6% in 
2009–2010 due to a further reduction in indirect taxes.  
4.3  Fiscal Stimulus Packages 
In their response to the global crisis, governments of different countries have put through an 
unprecedented, globally coordinated fiscal stimulus package. Consequently, in India also, 
three fiscal stimulus packages have been  unveiled since December 2008 to help the 
economic recovery. These have been largely in the form of a reduction in taxes and duties 
and, to some extent, incentives to the export sector. As we discussed above, the 
government had already allowed the fiscal deficit to expand beyond the originally targeted 
levels both in 2008–2009 and in early 2009–2010. Thus, luckily for India, its electoral cycle 
pushed up public expenditure  and  coincided with the global recession,  helping  India 
overcome the negative impact of the crisis. 
                                                                                                                                                  
liabilities of about Rs 1,600 billion (27.6% of the GDP), the combined outstanding liabilities accounts for 76.6% 
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The first fiscal stimulus package was introduced on 7 December 2008, the second on 2 
January 2009, and the third one on 24 February 2009. These included an across-the-board 
central excise duty reduction by 4%, additional plan spending of Rs 200 billion, additional 
borrowing by state governments of Rs 300 billion for planned expenditure, assistance to 
certain export industries in the form of interest subsidy on export finance, refund of excise 
duties and central sales tax, other export incentives, and a 2% reduction in central excise 
duties and service tax, i.e., combined reduction of 6% in central excise duties. The total 
fiscal burden for these packages amounted to 1.8% of GDP in 2008–2009. Along with the 
expansion undertaken in the two budgets, the total fiscal stimulus over the last two years can 
be estimated at 3% of the GDP. 
4.4  Projections 
The authors made projections of the shares of the combined fiscal deficit and public debt 
(combined outstanding liabilities) to GDP for six to seven years down the line. The 
projections are given in Table 4.2. We projected both fiscal deficit and public debt as a share 
of GDP based on the past trends. The estimation
33 is carried out from 1980–1981 to 2007–
2008.  The optimal number of lags in the estimation was selected by using the Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC)
34
The projections show that the fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP will increase from 8.9% 
in 2008–2009 to 10% in 2009–2010 and probably remain at the same level for 2010–2011. 
While these projections indicate that there will be a subsequent reduction in the deficit, the 
decline is insignificant until 2015–2016. If, however, the stimulus is withdrawn and GDP 
grows faster than the underlying rate that has been assumed, then fiscal deficit may return to 
the path prescribed by FRBM targets in the near future. The share of public debt in GDP will 
increase at a marginal pace. What these figures indicate is that the fiscal situation might 
deteriorate further if appropriate measures are not taken to control the deficit and public 
debt. 
. 
Table 4.2: Projections (As a % of GDP) 
Year  Gross Fiscal Deficit  Public Debt 
2008–2009  8.9  74.7 
2009–2010  10.0  75.4 
2010–2011  10.0  75.7 
2011–2012  9.9  75.9 
2012–2013  9.9  76.1 
2013–2014  9.8  76.3 
2014–2015  9.8  76.4 
2015–2016  9.7  76.6 
4.4.1  Debt to GDP Ratio 
The basic rule in debt dynamics is that the debt ratio will rise if there is a primary deficit and 
if the interest rate of debt exceeds the growth rate of GDP. Therefore, to reduce the ratio of 
debt to GDP, there must either be a primary surplus or the economy should grow faster than 
the rate of interest, or both. If one condition holds, it must be large enough to outweigh the 
                                                 
33 GDP has been estimated by using ICRIER’s revised estimates (6.8%). 
 
34 GFDt=α+β*GFDt-1+µt and Dt= γ+δ*Dt-1+µt where GFD and D stand for fiscal deficit and public debt. ADBI Working Paper No. 249    Kumar and Soumya 
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adverse effect of the other
35. We have estimated
36
Table 4.3: Debt Ratios with GDP Growth at 12% and Alternative Interest Rates 
 various scenarios of India’s debt to GDP 
ratios from 2009–2010 to 2015–2016 on three alternative assumptions of nominal GDP 
growth rate (12%, 13%, and 14%), interest rate on debt (7%, 8%, and 9%) and primary 
deficit as percent of GDP (3%, 4%, and 5%). These are shown in Tables 4.3–4.5. Here g = 
nominal growth rate, i = nominal interest rate, p = primary deficit. 




g = 12%, i = 7%,  g = 12%, i = 8%,  g = 12%, i = 9%, 







5%  p = 3%  p = 4%  p = 
5% 
2008–
2009  74.7  74.7  74.7  74.7  74.7  74.7  74.7  74.7  74.7 
2009–
2010  74.4  75.4  76.4  75.0  76.0  77.0  75.7  76.7  77.7 
2010–
2011  74.0  76.0  78.0  75.4  77.3  79.3  76.7  78.6  80.6 
2011–
2012  73.7  76.6  79.5  75.7  78.6  81.4  77.6  80.5  83.5 
2012–
2013  73.4  77.2  80.9  76.0  79.7  83.5  78.5  82.4  86.2 
2013–
2014  73.2  77.7  82.3  76.2  80.9  85.6  79.4  84.2  88.9 
2014–
2015  72.9  78.3  83.6  76.5  82.0  87.5  80.3  85.9  91.5 
2015–
2016  72.6  78.8  84.9  76.8  83.1  89.4  81.2  87.6  94.1 
Table 4.4: Debt Ratios with GDP Growth at 13% and Alternative Interest Rates 
and Primary Deficits 
 
Year/dt (%) 
g = 13%, i = 7%,  g = 13%, i = 8%,  g = 13%, i = 9%, 









2008–2009  74.7  74.7  74.7  74.7  74.7  74.7  74.7  74.7  74.7 
2009–2010  73.7  74.7  75.7  74.4  75.4  76.4  75.1  76.1  77.1 
2010–2011  72.8  74.8  76.7  74.1  76.1  78.0  75.4  77.4  79.3 
2011–2012  72.0  74.8  77.6  73.8  76.7  79.6  75.7  78.6  81.5 
2012–2013  71.1  74.8  78.5  73.6  77.3  81.0  76.0  79.8  83.6 
2013–2014  70.4  74.9  79.3  73.3  77.9  82.5  76.4  81.0  85.7 
2014–2015  69.6  74.9  80.1  73.1  78.4  83.8  76.7  82.1  87.6 
2015–2016  68.9  74.9  80.9  72.8  79.0  85.1  76.9  83.2  89.5 
 
                                                 
35 See Mason (1985), Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Spaventa (1987), Bispham (1987), Blanchard (1990), 
Feldstein (2004), Rangarajan and Srivastava (2005). 
36 The estimation is done by using the basic equation for debt ratio dt = pt + dt-1(i-gt) / (1+gt) + dt-1 where dt = 
debt-GDP ratio in time t, pt = primary deficit-GDP ratio, dt-1 = debt-GDP ratio in time t-1, i = interest rate on 
debt, gt = GDP growth rate in nominal terms in time t. ADBI Working Paper No. 249    Kumar and Soumya 
23 
Table 4.5: Debt Ratios with GDP Growth at 14% and Alternative Interest Rates 
and Primary Deficits 
 
Year/dt (%) 












2008–2009  74.7  74.7  74.7  74.7  74.7  74.7  74.7  74.7  74.7 
2009–2010  73.1  74.1  75.1  73.8  74.8  75.8  74.4  75.4  76.4 
2010–2011  71.6  73.6  75.5  72.9  74.8  76.8  74.2  76.1  78.1 
2011–2012  70.2  73.0  75.9  72.0  74.9  77.7  73.9  76.8  79.6 
2012–2013  68.9  72.6  76.2  71.3  75.0  78.6  73.7  77.4  81.2 
2013–2014  67.7  72.1  76.5  70.5  75.0  79.5  73.4  78.0  82.6 
2014–2015  66.5  71.7  76.8  69.8  75.1  80.3  73.2  78.6  84.0 
2015–2016  65.4  71.3  77.1  69.1  75.1  81.1  73.0  79.1  85.3 
From the above alternative scenarios, the best-case scenario is when GDP is growing at 
14%, primary deficit is 3% of GDP and interest rate on debt is 7%. In this case, the debt ratio 
will decline to 65.4% in 2015–2016 from 74.7% in 2008–2009. The worst-case scenario is 
when GDP is growing at 12%, primary deficit is 5% of GDP, and the interest rate on debt is 
9%. In that case, the debt ratio will rise to 94.1% by 2015–2016. For the current year, with a 
nominal growth rate below 12.0%, a primary deficit of 4.5% and an interest rate of about 
7.5%, the emerging debt position is not a sustainable one. The policy implication is that India 
should strive to reduce primary deficit or achieve a primary surplus, raise the growth rate, 
and reduce the interest rate. The growth is in nominal terms and there is surely the option of 
inflating a pathway out of debt. However, this is not feasible given political sensitivity 
regarding inflation. 
5.  TOWARDS A FEASIBLE FISCAL EXIT STRATEGY—
RESTORING FRBM TARGETS 
At present, the focus around the world, as also in India, has shifted from managing the crisis 
to managing the recovery. The key challenge relates to the feasible fiscal exit strategy that 
needs to be designed and implemented. As a response to the current global crisis, the 
Indian government has adopted significant discretionary fiscal stimulus packages to promote 
investment and sustain aggregate demand. It is time now to move away from the stimulus 
packages and concentrate on long-term policy scenarios to control the fiscal situation as well 
as improve GDP growth. The magnitude of fiscal adjustment needed in the next couple of 
decades is almost unprecedented, especially for countries like India with relative high debt.
37
There is not much room for further fiscal policy action in terms of stimuli as the consolidated 
fiscal deficit of the central and state governments in 2008–2009 is already 9% of GDP. This 
may even rise further as budget estimates for 2009–2010 suggest the budget deficit is likely 
to be about 10% of GDP. It could be nearer to 12% if all the off-budget items are taken into 
account. This implies a significant increase in government borrowing, which has risen from 
 
However, the situation is manageable because of the high potential growth rates that may 
see nominal GDP growth of over 13–14% in coming years. 
                                                 
37 A study by the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department suggests that the countries those expected to have debt in 
excess of 60% of GDP by 2014 would have to maintain an average primary surplus (revenue less expenditure 
before interest payments) of 0.5–4.0% beginning in 2014 to reduce the debt to 60.0% of GDP by 2030 (Horton, 
Kumar, and Mauro 2009). 
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Rs 1,269.12 billion (US$25.3 billion
38
The key challenge involves balancing between public interventions and maintaining market 
confidence in the sustainability of public finances. This will involve focusing policy attention 
on removing some of the structural bottlenecks on raising the potential GDP growth rate. 
Essentially, this will imply efforts to improve the investment climate for both domestic and 
foreign investors, remove entry barriers to corporate investment in education and vocational 
training,  improve the delivery of public goods and services,  and expand physical 
infrastructure capacities, including a major effort to improve connectivity in the rural regions. 
Infrastructure is a key binding constraint on India’s growth and the government should take 
up long-term projects to improve infrastructure facilities. The government also needs to step-
up investment in human capital development through increased spending in areas such as 
primary education, primary health, and  research and development.  Investment in human 
capital  will help achieve inclusive growth, and  furthermore  such expenditures should be 
considered as part of capital expenditure rather than as revenue expenditure (which is how 
they are categorized now) since they yield a return in the long-term by way of inter-
generational equity and economic growth. These measures will constitute the package of 
second-generation structural reforms and will enable the Indian economy to climb out of the 
downward cyclical phase and then extend the upward phase for a longer period than was 
achieved in the last cycle. 
) in 2007–2008 to Rs 3,265.15 billion (US$65.3 billion) 
in 2008–2009 and is likely to be Rs 4,009.96 billion (US$80.1 billion) in 2009–2010. This 
also implies a further rise in the debt to GDP ratio, which is expected to go up to 77%. 
On the revenue side, one way to exit is to increase or restore excise duties, which were 
reduced during the economic slowdown, to previous levels.
39
An important step in this direction is the expected introduction of the GST in October 2010. 
GST is going to replace CENVAT, state VAT, and service tax. The salient features of GST 
are the following: 
 The consequent revenue gains 
can be used to generate employment in public infrastructure projects. However, given the 
uncertainty about the robustness of the recovery, completely reversing the tax cuts would 
affect the growth prospects. Partial reversing may help strengthen the revenues of the 
government without disrupting the growth prospects. Another possible option is to broaden 
the tax base. This will require changes to the tax structure, which is likely to become more 
important than before.  
A dual GST model with two separate components. Namely, the central GST (CGST) and 
state GST (SGST) will be introduced. 
Both the central governments and states have to levy GST concurrently on all goods and 
services other than a small list of exemptions.  
Cross-utilization of input tax credit between CGST and SGST will not be allowed except in 
case of inter-state transactions (IGST).  
GST will have a two-rate structure: a standard rate for most goods and a lower rate for 
necessities.  





                                                 
38  All dollar figures are in US dollars. 
39Since the growth in industrial production and exports is picking up and rise in the inflation rate is now seen as 
alarming, the government may find itself under pressure to contain the fiscal deficit and hence, to reverse the 
tax cuts. Also, politically this is an opportune moment to reverse tax. With no major elections due in 2010, the 
government has little to fear by way of an adverse political fallout if tax cuts are reversed.  
40 Task Force of Thirteenth Finance Commission (2010–2015). ADBI Working Paper No. 249    Kumar and Soumya 
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The proposed GST will be a comprehensive indirect tax levy on the manufacture, sale, and 
consumption of goods as well as services at a national level. It will allow a single price for 
each product across the country. The GST is likely to reduce indirect taxes paid on most of 
the goods and services as it would avoid the cascading effect. Product prices, therefore, can 
be expected to fall and ensure growth in demand. In addition, the integration of goods and 
services taxes will improve tax collections and thereby help increase economic growth. It will 
also end the long-standing differential treatment of the manufacturing and services sectors. 
Apart from eliminating cascading effects, double taxation, and other issues, the introduction 
of GST will facilitate credit on uniform terms across the entire supply chain and across all 
states. The consensus GST rates may emerge to be 14%. Even this will sharply bring down 
the incidence of indirect taxes in the economy and release new growth impulses. 
Another tax reform that is likely to be become effective in near future is the Direct Tax Code 
(DTC)
41
6.  CONCLUSION  
, which is designed to greatly simplify the dual tax structure. DTC will achieve this by 
eliminating distortions in the tax structure, expanding the tax base, and improving tax 
compliance by introducing moderate levels of taxation. Initial analysis shows that most of 
these objectives are achievable.  
The Indian economy was on a cyclical slowdown after a five-year record boom and there are 
reasonable expectations that the economy will go for another strong growth phase after this 
brief slowdown. The impact of the current global crisis on India has been significant in terms 
of fiscal imbalances and the lower GDP growth rate, though India did not have direct 
exposure to sub-prime assets. It also dealt a severe blow to investment sentiments and 
consumer confidence in the economy. The policy response so far has been prompt in the 
form of monetary easing and fiscal expansion. However, this has sharply reversed the 
steady fiscal improvement over the past five years and weakened public finances 
considerably. This phase of fiscal expansion has to be wound down to ensure that 
macroeconomic stability is not threatened and the economy does not suffer from entrenched 
inflationary expectations and high capital costs, both of which will adversely impact the 
potential growth rate. Thus, an exit strategy will have to be carefully designed. 
The objective of economic policy must be to maximize gains from global integration while 
ensuring a reduction in poverty and inequity. Therefore, a better way of responding to the 
crisis is to start the “second round of reforms” that are now overdue. The focus must now 
shift to promoting private investment, which can alone sustain rapid growth. It is hoped that 
the Thirteenth Finance Commission and the forthcoming budget will lay down a road map for 
bringing the fiscal balance back on the track laid down by the FRBM Act.  
                                                 
41 The major proposals contained in the DTC are cutting corporate profit tax from 34% (including surcharge and 
tax) to 25% (all inclusive) and changing the basis of the minimum alternate tax (MAT). Instead of 15% of book 
profits, it will be 2% of gross assets for non-banking companies and 0.25% of gross assets for banking 
companies. 
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Total Expenditure  17.6  16.0  15.5  15.9  16.8  17.1  15.8  14.1  14.1  15.1  16.9  17.4 
 Revenue Expenditure  11.4  12.2  13.2  13.2  13.8  13.1  12.2  12.2  12.5  12.6  15.1  15.3 
  Interest Payments  2.6  4.2  4.7  4.7  4.8  4.5  4.0  3.7  3.6  3.6  3.6  3.8 
  Subsidies  1.6  1.4  1.3  1.4  1.8  1.6  1.5  1.3  1.4  1.5  2.4  1.9 
 Capital Expenditure  6.2  3.7  2.3  2.7  3.0  4.0  3.6  1.9  1.7  2.5  1.8  2.1 
  Capital Outlay  3.7  2.3  1.1  1.5  1.3  1.0  0.9  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.2 
  Loans and Advances  2.5  1.4  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.7  1.5  1.5  2.3  1.6  1.9 
Total Receipts  18.7  17.8  18.0  18.3  19.0  19.7  18.7  17.4  17.1  18.3  20.0  20.2 
 Revenue Receipts  12.3  11.8  11.6  11.2  11.7  12.0  12.3  12.4  13.5  14.7  13.6  13.3 
  Tax Revenues  9.9  9.3  9.0  8.2  8.8  9.2  9.7  10.2  11.5  12.6  11.8  10.9 
   Direct Taxes  2.0  2.6  3.2  3.0  3.4  3.8  4.2  4.6  5.6  6.6  6.5  6.3 
    Personal Income Tax  -  1.2  1.5  1.4  1.5  1.5  1.6  1.6  1.8  2.2  2.0  1.8 
    Corporate Tax  -  1.3  1.7  1.6  1.9  2.3  2.6  2.8  3.5  4.1  4.2  4.4 
   Indirect Taxes  7.9  6.7  5.7  5.2  5.4  5.4  5.5  5.6  5.9  5.9  5.3  4.6 
    Excise Duties  -  3.6  3.3  3.2  3.3  3.3  3.2  3.1  2.8  2.6  2.0  1.7 
    Custom Duties  -  2.9  2.3  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  2.1  2.2  2.0  1.8 
    Service Tax  -  -  -  -  0.3  0.3  0.5  0.6  0.9  1.1  1.2  1.1 
   Non-Tax Revenues  2.4  2.5  2.7  3.0  2.9  2.8  2.6  2.1  2.0  2.2  1.8  2.4 
 Capital Receipts  6.4  6.0  6.4  7.1  7.3  7.7  6.4  5.0  3.6  3.6  6.4  6.9 
  Disinvestment Receipts    0.2  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.6  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.8  0.2  0.0 
Revenue deficit  1.7  3.0  4.1  4.4  4.4  3.6  2.5  2.6  1.9  1.1  4.5  4.8 
Gross Fiscal Deficit  6.7  5.9  5.7  6.2  5.9  4.5  4.0  4.1  3.5  2.7  6.1  6.8 
Gross Primary Deficit  4.1  1.6  0.9  1.5  1.1  0.0  0.0  0.4  -0.2  -0.9  2.5  3.0 
Source: RBI, various issues. ADBI Working Paper No. 249    Kumar and Soumya 
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APPENDIX 2  

























Total Expenditure  15.7  15.4  16.2  16.2  16.7  18.7  17.6  15.7  15.9  15.5  17.3  17.7 
 Revenue Expenditure  11.4  12.5  13.7  13.6  13.5  13.5  12.8  12.2  12.2  12.0  13.4  14.0 
  Interest Payments  1.1  1.9  2.4  2.7  2.8  2.9  2.7  2.3  2.3  2.1  2.0  2.0 
 Capital Expenditure  4.3  2.9  2.5  2.6  3.2  5.1  4.8  3.4  3.7  3.5  3.9  3.6 
  Capital Outlay  1.9  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.5  1.9  1.9  2.2  2.4  2.4  2.8  2.6 
  Loans and Advances  1.3  0.8  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.8  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.3  - 
Total Receipts  15.5  15.4  16.3  16.0  16.9  18.7  17.9  16.6  16.3  15.8  17.0  17.1 
 Revenue Receipts  11.5  11.3  11.1  10.9  11.1  11.2  11.5  12.0  12.8  12.9  13.6  13.4 
  Tax Revenues  
 (Including Share in  
Central Pool) 
7.6  7.7  7.8  7.7  7.9  8.0  8.3  8.5  9.0  9.3  9.6  - 
  Non-Tax Revenues  3.9  3.6  3.2  3.2  3.3  3.2  3.3  3.5  3.8  4.0  3.9  - 
 Capital receipts  4.0  4.1  5.2  5.1  5.7  7.5  6.4  4.6  3.5  2.9  3.4  3.7 
Revenue deficit  -0.1  1.2  2.6  2.7  2.3  2.3  1.2  0.2  -0.6  -0.9  -0.1  0.6 
Gross Fiscal Deficit  2.8  3.1  4.2  4.1  4.1  4.4  3.4  2.5  1.9  1.4  2.7  3.4 
Gross Primary  
Deficit 
1.7  1.2  1.8  1.4  1.3  1.5  0.7  0.2  -0.4  -0.6  0.7  1.4 




  Table A3: Chronology of Fiscal Reforms in India List of Fiscal Reforms 
Effective Year  Reform  Objective  Changes 
1954–1955  The Taxation Enquiry 
Commission 
Raising tax revenue 
through higher taxes and 
greater progressivity of 
direct taxes. 
82.5% slab over Rs 2.5 lakh with the surcharge of 10%. 
28 February 1970–1971  Budget Report 
presented by Ms. 
Indira Gandhi 
Increasing income tax and 
wealth tax to achieve 
greater equality of income 
and wealth. 
93.5% slab over Rs 2 lakh with the surcharge of 10%. 
28 May 1971–1972  Budget Report 
presented Mr. Y.B. 
Chavan 
Raising surcharge and 
capital gain tax. 
Increase in surcharge to 15% leading to increase in top 
marginal income tax rate to 97.75% 
1971–1972  The Wanchoo Direct 
Taxes Enquiry 
Committee (WDTEC) 
Revision of income tax 
rates. 
 
Suggestions: Reduction of the effective top marginal rate to 
70%. 
28 February 1974–1975  Budget Report 
presented by Mr. 
Y.B. Chavan  
Decreasing income tax 
rates following WDTEC 
report recommendations 
and increasing the wealth 
tax rate. 
Decrease in surcharge to 10% and top marginal income tax 
rate to 70%. 
15 March 1976–1977  Budget Report 
presented by Mr. C. 
Subramanium 
Reducing income tax rates 
further and decreasing 
wealth tax rate. 
Decrease in top marginal income tax rate to 66% (60% plus 
10% surcharge). ADBI Working Paper No. 249    Kumar and Soumya 
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1978–1979  L K Jha Committee 
on Indirect Taxes 
Reviewing the structure of 
indirect taxes, examining 
the role of indirect taxation 
in promoting growth and 
examining the feasibility of 
adopting Value Added Tax 
(VAT) and other measures. 
Recommendations: 
 i) Rationalization of the duty structure on final products and 
raw materials. 
ii) Taking major steps within a time-bound program of 
action to avoid cascading.  
iii) Moving over to VAT at the manufacturers stage. 
iv) Sales taxation by a state should be essentially imposed 
on its residents without impinging on cost of production and 
without significantly affecting the residents of other states. 
v) Principle of a unified market within the country should be 
preserved. 
vi) There should be uniformity in procedures and broad 
structure of taxation in different states. 
28 February 1979–1980  Budget Report 
presented by Mr. 
Charan Singh 
Increasing income tax 
surcharge and wealth tax 
again. 
i) Increase in effective top marginal income tax rate to 72%.  
ii) Increase in top wealth tax rate to 5% for net wealth over 
Rs 15 lakh. 
18 June 1980–1981  Budget Report 
presented by Mr. R. 
Venkataramanan 
Reverting to the top 
effective income tax rate 
and giving relief on wealth 
tax. 
Decrease in top marginal income tax rate to 66% (60% plus 
10% surcharge.) 
28 February 1983–1984  Budget Report 
presented by Mr. 
Pranab Mukheree 
  Increase in surcharge to 12.5%. 
29 February 1984–1985  Budget Report 
presented by Mr. 
Pranab Mukheree 
  Decrease in top effective rate to 62% by cutting the top 
marginal rate to 55%.  
16 March 1985–1986  Budget Report 
presented by Mr. 
V.P.Singh 
Comprehensive direct tax 





i) Decrease in top marginal income tax rate to 50% and 
wealth tax to 2%..  
ii) Estate duty was abolished. 
iii) Reduced number of income tax slabs to four from eight. 
iv) Decrease in company tax to 50%. 
v) Unifying the tax rate to 55% for closely held companies.  ADBI Working Paper No. 249    Kumar and Soumya 
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December 1985–1986  Mr. V.P.Singh placed 
Long-Term Fiscal 
policy in the 
Parliament 
  Recommendations:  
i) Bringing out a medium term fiscal policy as a public 
document.  
ii) Embedding tax policy intentions within an explicit macro 
fiscal framework. 
iii) Sweeping reforms of central excise and customs duties. 
iv) Phased introduction of VAT in excise taxation and 
conferred the name Modified VAT (MODVAT). 
28 February 1986–1987  Budget Report 
presented by Mr. 
V.P.Singh 
  Implementation of MODVAT - It enabled manufacturers to 
deduct the excise paid on domestically produced inputs 
and countervailing duties paid on imported inputs from their 
excise duty on output. By 1990 MODVAT covered all sub-
sectors of manufacturing except petroleum products, 
textiles, and tobacco. 
4
th  Quarter Fiscal Year 
1991-1992 
(Interim report 
presented in December 
1991, followed by a two 
part final report in 





Simplification  and 
rationalization of direct tax 
structure. 
 
i) Introduction of three-tier personal income tax structure 
with an entry rate of 20% and a top rate of 40% (The 
maximum marginal rate of personal income tax has been 
reduced to 40% from 56% in June 1991).  
ii) The rates of corporate income tax for both publicly listed 
companies and closely held companies have been unified 
and reduced to 46% from 51.75% 57.5% respectively. 
iii) Abolition of wealth tax. 
iv) Reduction of the extraordinarily high import duties to a 
range of 15% to 30% for manufacturers, reduction of 
multiple tax rates to three in the range of 10% to 20% and 
extension of MODVAT credit to all inputs including 
machinery.  
28 February 1992–




15 March 1995–1996 
Budget Report 
presented by Mr. 
Manmohan Singh 
Decreasing import duties.  Reduction in import duties to:  
•  110% in 1992–1993. 
•  85% in 1993–1994. 
•  65% in 1994–1995. 
•  50% in 1995–1996. ADBI Working Paper No. 249    Kumar and Soumya 
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1 July 1994  Chelliah committee  Widening the  tax base by 
including  the service tax 
and extending its coverage 
gradually. 
Services brought under the tax net in 1994–1995 are 
Telephone, Stockbroker and General Insurance at the tax 
rate of 5% . 
February  1991–1992 to 
1996–1997 
    i) New taxes such as Securities Transaction Tax (STT), and 
Dividend Distribution Tax (DDT) partly reversed the move 
towards a simpler system. 
ii) India entered into Double Taxation Avoidance 
Agreement (DTAA) with 65 countries including countries 
like  US,  United Kingdom, Japan, France, and  Germany. 
These agreements provide relief from double taxation in 
respect of incomes by providing exemption and also by 
providing credits for taxes paid in one of the countries. 
22 July 1996–1997 
 
Finance Act    Advertising agencies, courier agencies and radio pager 
services were added to Service Tax Net. 
1997–1998      Minimum Alternative Tax (MAT) was introduced in 1997–
1998 
28 February 1997–1998  Budget Report 
presented by Mr. P. 
Chidambaram 
  i) Reduction in excise duty rates. 
ii) Reduction in custom duties to 40%. 
iii) Reduction in triple rate structure of personal income tax 
to 10–20–30%. 
iv) Decrease in company tax rate to 35%. 
v) Abolition of dividend taxation in the recipients’ hands and 
replacing it with a 10% tax at company stage. 
28 February 1997–1998 
and  
1 June 1998–1999 
Annual Budgets    Eight more services were added to Service Tax Net 
27 February 1999–2000  Budget Report 
presented by Mr. 
Yashwant Sinha 
  i) Excise duties ranging from 5% to 40% were clubbed into 
three rates; 8%, 16% and 24%. 
ii) Two non-MODVAT, additional special excise rates (6% 
and 16%) were levied on luxury consumer goods. 
29 February 2000–2001  Budget Report 
presented by Mr. 
Yashwant Sinha 
  Converted  the three excise duties into a single CENVAT 
rate of 16% buttressed by a few selective excises on luxury 
consumer goods. ADBI Working Paper No. 249    Kumar and Soumya 
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2001–2002  “Govinda Rao” 
Expert group on 
Taxation of Services 
  Recommendations: Introduction of credit for taxes paid on 




Committee  -(Kelkar 
reports of Task 
Forces on Direct and 
Indirect taxes (2002a 
and 2002b) 
 
Taxation reforms to be 
introduced for the smooth 
and proper administration 
of the tax law, and also 
improve the tax collections. 
Recommendations: The task force had given its 
recommendations on the aspects relating to direct and 
indirect taxes such as: 
i) Doubling the exemption limit for personal income tax.  
ii) Abolishing taxes on equity capital gains and dividends 
received by individuals. 
iii) Moving to dual rate structure in excise and custom 
duties. 
(These recommendations were severely criticized by 
economists like Bagchi, Chelliah, Acharya, Mukhopadhya 
et al.) 
iv) Abolition of minimum alternate tax is one of the major 
suggestions made by the task force. This was implemented 
in 2003–2004. 
8 July 2004–2005  Budget Report 
presented by Mr. P. 
Chidambaram 
  i) Abolition of taxation on long-term capital gains on all 
securities transactions. 
ii) Reduction in the rate on short-term capital gains to a flat 
10%. 
iii) Introduction of New Securities Transaction Tax (New 
STT), Fringe Benefit Tax (FBT), commodities transaction 
tax (CTT). 
June 2004–2005      Tax Information Network (TIN) and Online Tax Accounting 







Act that had been 
approved by the 
Parliament under the 
NDA government 
was notified by the 
successor UPA 
government. 
  Targets:  
i) Bringing down the revenue deficit by 0.5% of GDP each 
year until it becomes zero. 
ii) Reducing fiscal deficit by 0.3% each year to a total of 3% 
of GDP by 2008–2009. 
iii) Total liabilities of the Union Government should not rise 
by more than 9% a year. 
iv) Union Government shall not give guarantee to loans 
raised by Public Sector Units (PSUs)  and State 
Governments beyond 0.5% of GDP in the aggregate. 
 
2000–2001 to 
28 February 2005–2006 
    Reduction in customs duties from 35% to 15%. 
2005–2006  Introduction of Value 
Added Tax (VAT) 
VAT is designed to make 
accounting more 
transparent, cut trade 
barriers and boost tax 
revenues. 
Rates: 
i) 0.0% on necessities and some primary products 
i) 1.0% on bullion and precious stones. 
ii) 4.0% on industrial inputs and capital goods and items of 
mass consumption. 
iii) 12.5% on all other items. 
 
2003–2004 to  
February 2009–2010 
Changes in Service 
Tax 
  Rates levied: 
•  2003–2004: 8.0%. 
•  2004–2005: 10.0% and 2.0%  Education  Tax  was 
introduced. 
•  2006–2007: 12.0%. 
•  February 2009–2010: 10.0%. 
•  Current: 10.2% along with 2.0% Education Tax. 
 
About 80 services covered under Service Tax Net to date. ADBI Working Paper No. 249    Kumar and Soumya 
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29 February 2008–2009 
 
Budget Report 
presented by Mr. P. 
Chidambaram 
  i) Changes in income tax slab; slab threshold of exemption 
for all Income Tax assesses raised from from Rs 1.10 lakh 
to Rs  1.50 lakh without any change in surcharge.  Every 
income tax payer gets relief of minimum of Rs 4,000. 
New tax slabs are: 10% for Rs 150,000 to 300,000, 20% for 
300,000 to 500,000 and 30% above 500,000 
ii) 2% reduction in central excise duties and service tax. 
ii) A commodities transaction tax (CTT) was introduced on 
the same lines as STT on options and futures traded in 
commodity exchanges. 
iii)  Plan expenditure fixed at Rs  2,43,000 crore which is 
32.4% in total expenditure and non-plan expenditure at 
5,74,000 crore. 
    First fiscal stimulus 
package was announced 
on 7 December 2008 to 
fight against global crisis. 
i) Across-the-board central excise duty reduction by 4%. 
ii) Rs 20,000 crore increase in plan expenditure. 
6 July 2009–2010  Budget Report 
presented by Mr. 
Pranab Mukheree 
  i) 34% increase in plan expenditure and 37% increase in 
non-plan expenditure (due to factors such as Sixth Pay 
Commission and  subsidies).  Total expenditure increased 
by 36% over 2008–2009 budget.  
ii) Exemption limit in personal income tax raised by Rs 
10,000 from Rs 1.50 lakh to Rs 1.60 lakh.  
iii) Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) to be increased to 15% of 
book profits from 
10%. 
iv) Abolition of FBT, CTT. 
ii) Fiscal deficit and revenue deficit of the Central 
government are projected as 6.8% and 4.8% of GDP 
respectively. ADBI Working Paper No. 249    Kumar and Soumya 
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    Second and third fiscal 
Stimulus packages on 2 
January 2009 and 24 
February 2009. 
i) Service tax cut from 12% to 10%. 
ii) 2 percentage-point reduction in both central excise duties 
and service tax.  
iii) Additional borrowing by state governments of Rs 
300,000 crore for planned expenditure. 
iv) Assistance to certain export industries in the form of 
interest subsidy on export finance. 
v) Refund of excise duties and central sales tax and other 
export incentives. 
vi) Along with the expansion undertaken in the two budgets, 
the total fiscal stimulus in the last two years can be 
estimated as 3% of the GDP. 
October 2010–2011  Introduction of the 
Goods and Services 
Tax (GST)  
  Salient features: 
i)  A dual GST model with two separate components 
namely, Central GST (CGST) and State GST (SGST) will 
be introduced. 
ii) Both the center and states have to levy GST concurrently 
on all goods and services other than a small list of 
exemptions. 
iii) Cross-utilization of input tax credit between CGST and 
SGST will not be allowed except in case of inter-state 
transactions (IGST). 
iv) GST to have a two-rate structure: a standard rate for 
most of the goods and a lower rate for necessities. 
 
April 2011–2012  Possible introduction 
of the Direct Tax 
Code (DTC)  
  Major proposals: 
i) To cut corporate profit tax from 34% (including surcharge 
and tax) to 25% (all inclusive). 
ii) To change the basis of Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT). 
Instead of 15% of book profits, it will be 2% of gross assets 
from non-banking companies and 0.25% of gross assets for 
banking companies.  
 
 
 